Albert Einstein

 Passage 1 is adapted from Albert Einstein, "Albert Einstein Warns of Dangers in Nuclear Arms Race "@1950 by NBCUniversal Media, LLC. Passage 2 is adapted from Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security." originally delivered in 1983. The USA and the USSR (the Soviet Union) engaged in a nuclear arms race from the late 1940s through the 1980s.

Passage 1 The idea of achieving security throu g h national armament is, at the present state of military technique, a disastrous illusion. On the part of the Line U.S.A. this illusion has been particularly fostered by s the fact that this country succeeded first in producing an atomic bomb. The belief seemed to prevail that in the end it would be possible to achieve decisive military superiority. In this way, any potential opponent would be intimidated, and security, so ardently desired by all of us, brought to us and all of humanity. The maxim which we have been following during these last five years has been, in short: security through superior military power, whatever the cost.

Is there any way out of this impasse created by 1s man himself? All of us, and particularly those who are responsible for the attitude of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R, should realize that we ma y have vanquished an external enemy, but have been incapable of getting rid of the mentality created by the war [World War 20 II]. It is impossible to achieve peace as long as every single action is taken with a possible future conflict in view. The leading point of view of all political action should therefore be: what can we do to bring about peaceful coexistence and even loyal cooperation of  the nations? The first problem is to do away with mutual fear and distrust. Solemn renunciation of violence (not only with respect to means of mass destruction) is undoubtedly necessary. Such renunciation, however, can be effective only if at the same time a supranational judicial and executive body is set up empowered to decide questions of immediate concern to the security of the nations.

Even a declaration of the nations to collaborate loyally in the realization of such a "restricted world  government" would considerably reduce the imminent danger of war.

In the last analysis, every kind of peaceful cooperation among men is primarily based on mutual trust and only secondly on institutions such as courts of justice and police. This holds for nations as well as for individuals. And the basis of trust is loyal give and take.

Passage2 Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong  deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control.

"Deterrence" means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains.

so Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression.

This strategy of deterrence has not changed, it still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed. It took one kind of military force to deter an attack when we had far more nuclear weapons than any other power; it takes another kind now that the Soviets, for example, have enough accurate and powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually all of 60 our missiles on the ground. Now, this is not to say that the Soviet onion is planning to make war on us.

Nor do I believe a war is inevitable - quite the contrary. But what must be recognized is that our security is based on being prepared to meet all threats There was a time when we depended on coastal forts and artillery batteries, because, with the weaponry of that day, any attack would have had to come by sea. Well, this is a different world, and our 10 defenses must be based on recognition and awareness of the weaponry possessed by other nations in the nuclear age.

We can't afford to believe that we will never be threatened. There have been two world wars in my  lifetime. We didn't start them and, indeed, did everything we could to avoid being drawn into them.

But we were ill-prepared for both. Had we been better prepared, peace might have been preserved.

I know that all of you want peace, and so do I. I BO know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war. It would be largely unverifiable and would seriously undercut our  negotiations on arms reduction. It would reward the Soviets for their massive military buildup while preventing us from modernizing our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces. With their present margin of superiority,  why should they agree to arms

reductions knowing that we were prohibited from catching up?